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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this Court is proper pursuant to Utah Code§ 78A-3-102(3). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE 1: WHETHER PLAINTIFFS HAVE STANDING TO 
MAINTAIN THIS ACTION. 
Standard of review: Determinations of the legal requirements for standing 
are reviewed for correctness. Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, ,I 10, 154 P.3d 808. 
The same is true for review of mootness, which directly impacts standing. While a 
Rule 60(b) motion is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion, when that motion 
is predicated on an interpretation of whether jurisdiction exists under a Utah 
\iJY statute, the jurisdictional analysis is reviewed for correctness. Jackson Constr. Co. 
v. Marrs, 2004 UT 89, ,I 8, 100 P.3d 1211; Franklin Covey Client Sales v. Melvin, 
2000 UT App 110, ,I 8, 2 P.3d 451, 454; see also Lamoreaux v. Black Diamond 
Holdings, 2013 UT App 32, ,I 5,296 P.3d 780. 
Preservation: Standing is a jurisdictional requirement, Brown v. Division 
of Water Rights, 2008 UT App 353, ,I 6, 195 P.3d 933, and therefore can be raised 
at any time. Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68, ,I 50, 123 P.3d 416. The issue of 
whether Plaintiffs had statutory standing was also raised in the lower court. (E.g., 
R. 1407; R. 1414-24; R. 1498-1503; R. 1885; R. 6819; R. 6864; R. 7009.) It was 
~ further raised in the Rule 60(b) motion, (R. 7294), as was Schvaneveldt's 
~ 1 
compliance with Rule 60(b)' s timeliness and diligence requirements. (R. 7311-
19.) 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES, AND ORDINANCES 
Assumed name statute 
Utah Code§ 42-2-10: 
Any person who carries on, conducts, or transacts business under an 
assumed name without having complied with the provisions of this chapter, 
and until the provisions of this chapter are complied with: 
( 1) shall not sue, prosecute, or maintain any action, suit, counterclaim, 
cross complaint, or proceeding in any of the courts of this state; .... 
Revised Limited Liability Company Act (2006) 
Utah Code § 48-2c- l l 6: 
A member or manager of a [limited liability] company is not a proper 
party to proceedings by or against a company, except when the object is to 
enforce a member's or manager's right against, or liability to, the company. 
Utah Code § 48-2c-601 : 
[N]o organizer, member, manager, or employee of a company is 
personally liable under a judgment, decree, or order of a court, or in any 
other manner, for a debt, obligation, or liability of the company or for the 
acts or omissions of the company or of any other organizer, member, 
manager, or employee of the company. 
Utah Code § 48-2c-802(3 ): 
[U]nless the articles of organization expressly limit their authority, 
any member in a member-managed company, or any manager in a manager-
managed company, may sign, acknowledge, and deliver any document 
transferring or affecting the company's interest in real or personal property, 
and if the authority is not so limited, the document shall be conclusive in 
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favor of a person who gives value without knowledge of the lack of 
authority of the person who signs and delivers the document. 
Rule 60(b ), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered 
evidence; fraud, etc. -- On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court 
may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative 
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered 
evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to 
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore 
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of 
an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been 
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based 
has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the 
judgment should have prospective application; or ( 6) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be 
made within a reasonable time and for reasons ( 1 ), (2), or (3 ), not more than 
90 days after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment 
or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to 
entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or 
proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The 
procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as 
prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
URCPRule 60 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case, course of proceedings and disposition below 
This case arises out of a failed real estate transaction. Much of the history of 
the case has been related in other briefs, particularly Appellant's Brief in case 
'°"' number 20130746-CA. Summarizing, Appellant Charles "Chuck" Schvaneveldt 
challenged the Plaintiffs' standing throughout this case. After trial particular facts 
3 
crune to light as to Plaintiffs' efforts to deflect the standing arguments, namely, that 
a heretofore unknown broker, Dale Quinlan, was the only person who could bring 
the suit. Schvaneveldt brought this to the district court's attention through a 
motion shortly before the final judgment was entered, and then through Rule 60(b ). 
The Rule 60(b) motion was denied. Procedural facts relating to the Rule 60(b) 
relief follow. 
ReMax Elite, a dba, interpled earnest money being disputed by two parties 
to a real estate contract, Emmett Warren and or Assigns (Buyers) and Still 
Standing Stables, LLC (Seller). The contract was a Real Estate Purchase Contract 
("REPC"), along with a For Sale By Owner Commission Agreement & Agency 
Disclosure ("FSBO"). (R. 38; 68-78.) A copy of the FSBO is attached hereto as 
Add. Exh. 1, and the REPC is attached as Add. Exh. 2. 
Nearly two years later, Buyers and Seller settled their dispute. ReMax Elite 
then asserted claims for a commission against Still Standing Stables, Schvaneveldt 
( a member of the LLC), and Cathy Code (Schvaneveldt' s girlfriend and later wife). 
This appeal treats the Plaintiffs' standing to maintain this action, and, 
specifically, whether crucial events affecting that standing were not considered by 
the district court through its rejection of Schvaneveldt's Rule 60(b) motion. As 
required by U.R.A.P. 24(a)(7), Schvaneveldt hereby provides (as briefly as 
possible) the relevant procedural history of the case with record citations: 
4 
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After the dba ReMax Elite filed its interpleader action against the parties to 
the REPC, Buyers (identified by ReMax Elite as "Purchaser") and Still Standing 
Stables (identified as "Seller"), (R. 1 ), Still Standing Stables answered and 
counterclaimed against ReMax Elite and Buyers' real estate agent, Tim Shea. (R. 
30.) Buyers answered, adding a cross-claim against Still Standing Stables and a 
third-party complaint against Schvaneveldt. (R. 52.) Schvaneveldt and Still 
Standing Stables answered Buyers' third party complaint and cross-claim (R. 95). 
After various amendments, early in 2008 Buyers and their assign reached a 
settlement with Still Standing Stables and Schvaneveldt, and the claims between 
them were dismissed by the court. (R. 538.) ReMax Elite and Buyers' agent Shea 
then amended their pleadings to demand a sales commission from Still Standing 
Stables under the FSBO. (R. 554.) The trial court ultimately barred Shea from 
pursuing this claim, as a claim for commission can only be brought by a licensed 
broker, not an agent. (R. 1081.) 
After a large portion of discovery was complete, Still Standing Stables 
added as additional third-party defendants Hilary "Skip" 0. Wing, Shane Thorpe, 
Scott Quinney, Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation dba ReMax Elite, Aspenwood 
Realty, LLC, Aspenwood Elite, and ReMax Realty. (R. 828.) It was alleged that 
ReMax Elite was simply a dba of Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation. The other 
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third-party defendants participated, it was alleged, in the management of 
Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation, either as principals, subsidiaries, or dbas. Id. 
ReMax and Shea then amended their complaint and third-party counterclaim 
again, adding as a defendant Schvaneveldt and as a Third Party Defendant Code. 
(R. 1232.) When answering this amended pleading, Schvaneveldt included as a 
third-party complaint the same causes of action against the Aspenwood parties 
previously alleged by Still Standing Stables. (R. 13 03.) Still Standing Stables and 
Schvaneveldt then filed a motion for summary judgment contending that ReMax 
Elite, a dba, could not collect a commission because it was not a broker nor owned 
by a broker. (R. 1407.) The trial court denied the motion. (R. 1885.) It was in this 
timeframe that mention of a Mr. Dale Quinlan first appeared in the record-in his 
deposition Shea stated that Quinlan was his first principal broker. This mention 
was neither material nor remarkable. (R. 1216.)1 
Despite already being named as third-party defendants in the litigation, 
Wing, Elite Legacy Corporation, and Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation moved 
to add themselves as plaintiffs, asserting that ReMax Elite was their dba. (R. 
2318.) Their objective was to dispense of Schvaneveldt's persistent objections 
based on standing by naming as plaintiffs those, they contended, constituted ( either 
1 Quinlan's name also figures on the ReMax letterhead used by Wing when he sent 
a letter setting the stage for the interpleader action. (R. 21.) Quinlan's name is one 
of many identified as real estate agents along the left margin. He is specifically not 
identified as a broker or principal broker. 
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individually or collectively) a broker that owned the dba and that could collect the 
commission. Shortly thereafter, these plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on 
all of Still Standing Stable's claims against them (R. 2887). 
The characters in the litigation were now beginning to gel. On the plaintiffs 
side, Wing was a principal broker, and associated with him, he alleged, were a 
~ mixture of persons and entities that together constituted his brokerage: entities, 
associate brokers and agents. These included (by their narratives) Tim Shea, Elite 
Legacy Corporation, Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation, Aspenwood Elite 
Legacy Corporation, Shane Thorpe, Scott Quinney, Aspenwood. Realty, LLC, 
Aspenwood Elite, and ReMax Realty. Wing initially alleged that Aspenwood 
Real Estate Corporation owned the ReMax Elite dba. (Later, ReMax Elite Legacy 
Corporation would also claim to own the ReMax Elite dba (R. 2364). On the 
defendants' side figured Still Standing Stables, its member Schvaneveldt, and his 
wife, Code. Defendants had requested in discovery the identity of the ReMax 
owners' group; many of those identified were now parties. Quinlan was not 
identified as a member of that group, and was not a party (R. 7369), but later was 
admitted by Plaintiffs to be the owner of the dba at the time the REPC and FSBO 
were signed. (R. 8087.) Wing attributed the misidentification of the proper owner 
of the dba to his being "mistaken." (R. 8094.) 
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The day before trial, the court dismissed Still Standing Stables as a 
defendant. (R. 8383, pp. 17-20; R. 5613.) The case then proceeded to trial against 
Schvaneveldt and Code. At the conclusion of Plaintiffs' case in chief: 
Schvaneveldt moved for a directed verdict, which was denied. (R. 5317.) 
Code moved for a directed verdict, which was granted. (R. 5424.) The jury 
entered a verdict against the sole remaining defendant, Schvaneveldt. Final 
judgment was then entered on January 2, 2013, with the only remaining issue being 
the determination of attorney fees. (R. 6067.) Schvaneveldt filed a motion for new 
trial (R. 6200), which was denied. (R. 6510.) Other post-trial motions went 
forward, and ultimately Still Standing Stables was awarded $2,659.73 in costs. (R. 
6732.) 
When an attempt was made to collect these costs, Wing denied that he was 
liable for them because, he argued, he was not a party to the contract on which 
ReMax Elite was suing. This prompted Still Standing Stables to bring a motion to 
identify real parties in interest, the nub of which was a contention that none of the 
plaintiffs had standing to pursue a commission. (R. 6819.) Schvaneveldt filed a 
companion motion, seeking dismissal of all of the named commission claim 
plaintiffs with prejudice and to have the judgment struck or otherwise made void. 
(R. 6864.) 
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Part of Schvaneveldt's strategy was to demonstrate that Wing was 
_represented in the action together with the other plaintiffs with which he had 
entered earlier in the litigation. In the course of arguing that point, Schvaneveldt 
attached a portion of Wing's deposition, in which Wing disavowed any role of 
Quinlan as a broker or owner of the dba. His statement was that Quinlan as "out of 
"' the picture." (R. 5785-86; 5820.) 
At this point Schvaneveldt had concluded that Quinlan was very much in the 
picture. His central argument was that Quinlan was the principal broker who had 
established, registered, and owned the dba ReMax Elite, the status of which had 
vexed the entire litigation. At least two of the Plaintiffs had claimed that they 
owned the dba. Now Quinlan appeared with documentation from the State of Utah 
that it was his. Quinlan also submitted an affidavit indicating that he had never 
transferred any commission agreement or contract rights to any other individual 
nor entity. Quinlan owned the ReMax Elite dba at the time of the execution of the 
v; FSBO and REPC in 2006. As such, the defendants argued that he was required to 
be the party seeking the commission. Moreover, Quinlan was no longer a principal 
broker at the time of the FSBO and REPC. Because Quinlan was neither a 
principal broker nor named ·as a party, the defendants argued, the commission 
claims asserted by his dba were void. (R. 6864.) 
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While the motions to dismiss and to identify real parties in interest were 
pending, Still Standing Stables and Schvaneveldt entered into a settlement 
agreement with Quinlan and his dba ReMax Elite to dismiss ReMax Elite's claims 
related to the commission. (R. 6990-91.) Settlement was limited to those parties 
identified as parties to the commission agreement, reserving any claims that Still 
Standing Stables or Schvaneveldt might have against others (Wing and the 
amalgam of others constituting his brokerage who remained as litigants). Id. The 
settlement agreement was the centerpiece of a motion Schvaneveldt filed to 
dismiss all of ReMax Elite's claims based on settlement agreement, (R. 6987), 
filed shortly after briefing on the real party and dismissal motions was complete. 
The district court on July 22, 2014, denied the real party and dismissal 
motions, and in the same order issued its final order calculating attorney fees and 
costs. (R. 7009.) The court first concluded that Wing could not avoid liability for 
attorney fees under the FSBO by characterizing himself as a nonparty to the 
agreement. The court then said that it was "dismay[ ed]" at the reassertion of 
standing arguments by the defendants at this point in the proceedings. While 
standing may be raised at any time during litigation, the court reasoned that it had 
lost jurisdiction once a final judgment was entered.2 After expressing its hesitancy 
2 Final judgment was entered January 2, 2013 (R. 6067), but the final appealable 
order was not entered until the court issued this very order in which it referred to 
the final judgment, issued July 22, 2013. (R. 7009.) Hence Schvaneveldt was 
10 
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to even engage in any analysis at all, the court concluded that the evidence 
suggesting that Wing was not the principal broker and that Quinlan owned the dba 
could have been found earlier, and therefore defendants' standing arguments were 
untimely. Id. 
Schvaneveldt then filed a Rule 52(b) motion to amend findings in the final 
~ judgment. (R. 7088.) He requested that all three named plaintiffs be removed 
from the commission judgment because none of them was the actual party to the 
FSBO agreement. He also requested that the court recognize as an undisputed fact 
that Quinlan was the certified and record owner of the dba ReMax Elite. He 
finally requested that a letter of transfer dated 9 March 2006, purporting to transfer 
the dba to Wing, and the Aspen wood articles of incorporation ( which might also be 
used to substantiate a transfer of the dba) be authenticated. Schvaneveldt 
contended that neither document was executed by Quinlan, and submitted an 
expert report to that effect (R. 7115) and a supporting affidavit from Quinlan. (R. 
~ 7899.) 
While this motion was pending, the court denied Schvaneveldt' s motion to 
dismiss based on the settlement agreement. (R. 714 7.) The court cited timeliness 
faced with a Catch-22 per the district court's reasoning: he could not raise standing 
because the district_ court had lost jurisdiction, but could not file a Rule 60(b) 
motion because up to that point no appealable order had been entered. But there 
was no Catch-22: the district court erred in stating it had lost jurisdiction. The 
district court always retained jurisdiction to rule on its jurisdiction, even at the time 
it entered the July 22 order. 
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and due diligence concerns, concluding that Quinlan's settlement did not have the 
effect Schvaneveldt claimed: "settling a claim that could be raised by third party 
does not per se indicate that the plaintiffs in this case did not have standing to 
assert their claims. At best the new evidence would raise material question of fact 
concerning proper ownership of the commission claim." 
Just over a month after filing his Rule 52(b) motion, Schvaneveldt filed a 
Rule 60(b) motion, the substance of which was that overwhelming documentation 
now showed that Wing was not the principal broker of the dba ReMax Elite, and 
therefore there was no proper party plaintiff in the action. (R. 7287.) 
No ruling was issued on the Rule 52(b) or Rule 60(b) motions for 
approximately nine months. At that point, Schvaneveldt submitted to the court 
supplemental exhibits and an additional memorandum in support of his Rule 52(b) 
and Rule 60(b) motion~ (R. 7854.) This evidence showed that Wing was not the 
owner of the contracting party dba ReMax Elite and was never the principal broker 
for the dba. Id. 
The court denied the rule 52(b) motion. (R. 8234.) The court found that 
information contained within the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code 
("Commercial Division")(including a determination by the State that the purported 
2006 transfer documents were forgeries, and that the dba had never been 





opined that ownership of the dba might be split between legal and equitable 
owners. (R. 8240-41.) The court also speculated that Quinlan "may have been 
simply functioning in his capacity as a participant in the business entity that owned 
the dba of Re Max Elite, when his name was placed on that document [ registration 
of the dba]." With respect to Wing, the court stated that "to the extent that Skip 
VP Wing is identified as a party in these proceedings, or as the holder of any claims, 
that identification is Mr. Skip Wing, in his representative capacity, as principal 
broker for the brokerage, or as an agent or representative of the brokerage, and 
does not represent his individual and personal ownership of those claims." (R. 
8243.) 
The trial court also denied the Rule 60(b) motion. (R. 8254, ruling attached 
as Add.Exh.3.) The court concluded that relief under Rule 60(b)(6) was not 
available. With respect to Rule 60(b )(5), the court ascribed no legal significance to 
Quinlan's settlement with the defendants because Quinlan's· ownership status had 
vi not been conclusively established. With respect to Rule 60(b )( 4 ), the court noted 
that arguments regarding standing had already been rejected in previous rulings. 
The court said that there were two separate questions at issue: Is there a properly 
registered dba for the business entity that asserted the claim, and who owns that 
dba? There may be argument about who owns a dba, the court said, but this did 
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not necessarily go to whether the lawsuit could be maintained by the dba in 
question. (R. 8263.) 
Related to other post-trial motions concerning the ownership of the dba, Still 
Standing Stable not only had settled all outstanding claims with Quinlan and 
ReMax Elite, but it had also had secured ownership of and registered the ReMax 
Elite dba. Based on these facts, Still Standing filed a motion to be substituted as 
plaintiff under Rule 25 as the rightful owner of the dba. (R. 8110.) The motion 
was denied. (R. 8444, pp. 30-36.) All parties appealed some aspect of the court's 
rulings and final judgments. 
In connection with the Rule 60(b) motion, Schvaneveldt presented a 
collection of evidence supporting his position that the Plaintiffs had been deceptive 
to validate their standing when they had none. That evidence included: 
1. Quinlan applied for the ReMax Elite dba in December 2004, a fact 
admitted by Plaintiffs. (R. 7297.) 
2. Plaintiffs contended that Quinlan transferred the ReMax Elite dba to 
Aspenwood in March, 2006. (R. 7299.) 
3. Quinlan submitted a declaration, signed July 5, 2013, that he owned 
the dba at the time of execution of both the FSBO and the REPC. (R. 7298-99.) 
He also stated that he did not transfer any rights in any commission or FSBO to 
any entity. (R. 7299.) 
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4. Schvaneveldt submitted A Letter of Transfer dated March 9, 2006, 
allegedly signed by Quinlan to ReMax, and later filed with the Commercial 
Division. (R. 687 4.) Quinlan in his declaration denies signing the letter and 
contends that is was forged. (R. 7300.) 
5. Schvaneveldt submitted a report from a forensic signature analyst 
declaring a high probability that the Quinlan signature on the March 9, 2006, letter 
was forged. (R. 73 00.) This same report reflects high probability of forgery of 
Quinlan's signature on Plaintiff Aspenwood's Articles of Incorporation. (R. 7300-
01.) 
6. Wing never claimed ownership of the dba ReMax Elite. (R. 7301.) 
7. Wing actively concealed Quinlan's ownership of the dba ReMax 
Elite, and deflected attention away from Quinlan by claiming the dba was owned 
by another. (R. 7304-6; 7311-19.) 
8. Quinlan surrendered his broker license under threat of censure in July, 
2005. (R. 7305.) 
9. The Commercial Division took administrative action to invalidate the 
transfer to Quinlan, based upon evidence of forgery, in December, 2013. (R. 
7733.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court erred by not granting the Rule 60(b) motion. It should 
have dismissed the case and struck the judgment because the Plaintiffs do not have 
standing to sue Schvaneveldt for recovery of a real estate commission under the 
FSBO agreement. Utah law is clear that only a principal broker can seek recovery 
for a real estate commission. The dba ReMax Elite is identified as the brokerage 
company party to the FSBO. The undisputed evidence shows that none of the 
Plaintiffs were the principal broker of dba ReMax Elite when the FSBO was 
executed, and none of the Plaintiffs ever became the principal broker of dba 
ReMax Elite. Rather, dba ReMax Elite was established, registered and owned by 
Dale Quinlan, a former principal broker. 
Quinlan did not sue the Defendants and assigned all of his interest and the 
interest of dba ReMax Elite in the FSBO agreement to Still Standing Stable, L.C. 
Accordingly, the Plaintiffs, never having been the principal broker for dba ReMax 
Elite, lacked, and continue to lack, standing under Utah law to sue Schvaneveldt 
under the FSBO. They cannot cure that defect. The evidence to this effect was 
dispositive and was the basis for striking the judgment in its entirety. 
Alternatively, the evidence was sufficiently probative to justify striking the 
judgment and addressing through the adversarial process concerns raised by 
Plaintiffs as to the evidence's reliability and probativeness. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING TO MAINTAIN THIS ACTION. 
Whether a party has standing to bring or maintain an action is a matter of the 
\/iO court's jurisdiction. The party pursuing the claim bears the burden of establishing 
standing. Society of Professional Journalists v. Bullock, 7 43 P .2d 1167, 1171 
~ (Utah 1986). 
In this case, the plaintiffs cannot establish standing for two independent 
reasons: First, by statute the Plaintiffs lacked standing in the court below. Second, 
the claimholder and associated rights have now been acquired by one of the 
defendants, Still Standing Stable, which does not wish to continue the action 
against Schvaneveldt. Because standing was raised early and often throughout the 
course of the litigation, Schvaneveldt discusses the substantive standards 
governing standing, how the standing issue evolved in the proceedings, and how 
standing and the associated notion of mootness were raised in the Rule 60(b) 
v; motion. 
A. The Plaintiffs lacked standing in the court below. 
Utah statutes impose specific restrictions on who may bring an action 
seeking a real estate commission. Under Utah law, only a "principal broker" can 
contract for, and later seek in the courts, a real estate commission: 
No sales agent or associate broker may sue in is own name for the 
recovery of a fee commission or compensation for services as sales 
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agent or associate broker unless the action is against the principal 
broker with whom he is or was licensed. Any action for the recovery 
of a fee, commission or other compensation may only be instituted 
and brought by the principal broker with who1n the sales agent or 
associate broker is affiliated. 
U.C.A. § 61-2-18 (now Utah Code§ 61-2f-305).3 
The purpose of this brokerage provision is to closely regulate the real estate 
industry to protect the public. Global Recreation, Inc. v. Cedar Hills Development 
Co., 614 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 1980); 12 AmJur 2dBrokers § 8. Consistent with the 
statute, Utah courts deny nonbrokers statutory standing to sue for commissions. 
See, e.g., Diversified Gen. Corp. v. White Barn Golf Course, 584 P.2d 848 (Utah 
_ 1978). Likewise, the trial court barred one of the original plaintiffs, Tim Shea, 
from suing for a commission under this statute. (R. 1885.) 
Because only a principal broker can collect a real estate commission in Utah, 
the number of persons who can bring such actions is small. Apart from this unique 
privilege of suing to collect commissions, a broker is free to conduct business as he 
or she sees fit under the various options provided for by law, for example, as a 
3 The Utah statutory scheme in place at the time of the REPC and FSBO 
contemplated a "principal broker" as the person who engages in the selling or 
listing for sale real estate for commission. A principal broker must be licensed by 
the state. Utah Code § 61-2-1 (2006). An associate broker is an independent 
contractor engaged by the principal broker. Utah Code § 61-2-2 (2006). A 
brokerage is the business activity (or office) of the broker, whether it be in the 
form of an entity or collection of entities and independent contractors that is 
supervised by the broker. 
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corporation, limited liability company, limited partnership, or the like. A common 
tool ~sed by business entities to enhance their brand and to make doing business 
easier is an assumed name. 
State statutes allow persons and entities to do business under assumed 
names, commonly known as a "doing business as" or "dba" names. However, the 
~ legislature also requires central registration of dbas to provide notice to the world 
that someone or something is acting under a fictitious identity. See generally Utah 
Code § 42-2-5, et seq. 
By statute, any person or entity who fails to properly register a dba is barred 
from bringing or maintaining an action: 
any person who carries on, conduct, or transacts business under an 
assumed name without having complied with the provisions of this 
chapter, and until the provisions of this chapter complied with: (1) 
shall not sue, prosecute, or maintain any action, suit, counterclaim, 
cross-complaint, or proceeding in any of the courts of this state .... 
Utah Code§ 42-2-10. 
This defect may be cured through proper registration while the action is 
pending. See, e.g., Graham v. Davis County Solid Waste Mgmt. & Energy 
Recovery Special Serv. Dist., 1999 UT App 136, 1115-16, 979 P.2d 363 (allowing 
amendment of pleadings after failure to register dba was cured). In this case, 
however, there was no cure and, as discussed below, there can never be one. 
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As noted above, the action was commenced by a dba, ReMax Elite. The 
FSBO itself was also in the name of "Re/Max Elite" See pp. 4-7 supra 
(Add.Exh.l, p. 1 § 1.) ReMax Elite was originally registered by a principal broker, 
Dale Quinlan, on December 28, 2004. (R. 6904, 6922.) Quinlan owned the dba 
ReMax Elite from the time he registered it in 2004 until it expired in January 2008. 
(R. 1702-03, 8044.) Normally, there would be nothing particularly noteworthy 
about a principal broker utilizing a dba. Here, however, Quinlan ceased 
functioning as a principal broker in late 2005. (R. 7305, 7353.) Skip Wing came 
in as a successor principal broker for the group of individuals and entities that 
comprised his brokerage. Id. Significantly, however, Wing was never assigned 
any interest in the ReMax Elite dba, which Quinlan continued to own. See pp. 5-7, 
supra. 
Thus, at the time of the transaction concerning Schvaneveldt (both the 
execution of the FSBO and the REPC), Wing was functioning as a principal broker 
- but not for the entity named on the two contracts (ReMax Elite). The only 
individual signing the two documents was the agent Tim Shea, who was incapable 
of binding the owner of the dba, since he was not acting on behalf of that owner 
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(Quinlan) and was not in any event able to act in any capacity on behalf of 
Quinlan, who was no longer acting as a principal broker.4 
This disconnect between the ReMax Elite dba and a principal broker is 
dispositive. Only a principal broker can contract for and seek a commission under 
Section 61-2-18; accordingly, for a dba to do the same, it must be a properly 
i./8 registered dba of a principal broker, as provided in Section 42-2-5, et seq. In short, 
the principal broker statute significantly narrows the class of individuals who 
might seek a real estate commission. The dba statute narrows that class even 
further, in this case, down to one person: Dale Quinlan. 
Schvaneveldt raised standing concerns early on in the litigation, putting the 
appellees on notice that the dba was not a proper party plaintiff. (E.g., R. 601 
(filed June 23, 2008).) The expired dba's lack of standing later became the 
gravamen of a motion for summary judgment. (R. 1702-03.) 
There is ample evidence that Wing and the other plaintiffs realized that the 
~ dba under which they were purporting to sue was never registered to Wing, and the 
ramifications thereof. Wing filed a declaration stating that, in the spring of 2006, 
Quinlan had approached the other owners of his company, Aspenwood Real Estate 
4 There are instances when naming individually the owners of a dba may cure a 
defective dba registration. See, e.g., Blodgett v. Zions First Nat'! Bank, 752 P.2d 
901, 905-06 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 
1062 (Utah 1981). That, however, did not occur here. Quinlan was never named as 
a party. Even if he had been, it would have cured nothing when he was not a 
principal broker at the time of the transaction and when the dba later expired. 
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Corporation, and had transferred the ReMax Elite dba to Aspenwood. (R. 7495, ilil 
7-12.) However, after an investigation involving the director of the Commercial 
Division, the State of Utah determined that the documents purporting to transfer 
the dba from Quinlan to Aspen wood were forgeries, and that ownership of the dba 
had never been transferred. (R. 7318, 7332-7350, 8146.) The Plaintiffs did not 
appeal or otherwise challenge the State's ruling. Record,passim. 
The Plaintiffs' inaction is significant. When opposing Schvaneveldt' s Rule 
60(b) motion, Plaintiffs argued that they had no opportunity to challenge the 
evidence that Schvaneveldt had introduced supporting his Rule 60(b) motion. 
While Plaintiffs accused Schvaneveldt below of "sneaking around" the 
Commercial Division and made further disparaging remarks about its executive 
staff (R. 7975), they never took substantive steps to challenge the Commercial 
Division's determination that Quinlan was and always has been the owner of the 
ReMax Elite dba. 
Yet Plaintiffs could have mounted such a challenge, and in the process avail 
themselves of due process. There were several avenues that plaintiffs could have 
pursued to challenge the Division's determination that Quinlan owned the ReMax 
Elite dba. 
Under Utah Administrative Code RI 54-100-2, adjudicative proceedings 
before the Commercial Division concerning assumed names are conducted on an 
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i. 
informal basis. This accounts for the nature of Ms Berg's letter. That action 
constituted a final order under Utah Administrative Code R154-100-2. To 
challenge that order, the first option the Plaintiffs had was to file a request for 
agency action with the Division under section 63G-4-201 of the Utah Code. 
Second, Plaintiffs could have filed a motion with the Division under Rule Rl 51-4-
v;J 301 of the Utah Administrative Code. Third, Plaintiffs could have requested that 
the Utah Department of Commerce review the Division's determination that 
Quinlan was the proper owner of the ReMax Elite dba under Rl 51-4-901 of the 
Utah Administrative Code and section 63G-4-301 of the Utah Code. Fourth, if the 
Division and Department of Commerce refused to remedy the alleged procedural 
improprieties, Plaintiffs could have sought a trial de novo with a district court 
under Utah Code 63G-4-402. Fifth, Plaintiffs could have requested relief under 
Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Tolman v. Salt Lake Cnty. 
Attorney, 818 P.2d 23 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (vacating a district court's decision not 
~ to grant extraordinary relief from an administrative body's decision, where the 
body "abused its discretion" in failing afford due process). 
Through any of these avenues, Plaintiffs could have argued that the Division 
failed to comply with procedural requirements of the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act or constitutional due process and asked to have the Division's 
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determination that Quinlan owned the ReMax Elite dba set aside, at least until the 
Division provided adequate process. Plaintiffs pursued none of these avenues. 5 
For whatever reason, the Plaintiffs made no attempt to challenge the 
Commercial Division's actions, either administratively or judicially. The district 
court, in its ruling questioning the propriety of using the administrative order as 
part of the chain of events leading Schvaneveldt to seek dismissal, did not invoke 
any governing regulations or statutes. Thus, the district court predicated its 
decision on an incorrect understanding of the law. The Plaintiffs simply chose not 
to act, and the district court did not question that inaction, without citation to 
authority. In this respect the Plaintiffs prevailed, but in the process have now 
waived whatever right they may have had to challenge the agency action. Quinlan 
is now vested with the dba, it has been transferred to Still Standing Stable (R. 
8123), and those parties have settled. The only issue remaining, then, is whether 
that set of facts satisfies the standard for Rule 60(b) relief. 
5 By requesting relief under Rule 60(b ), moreover, Schvaneveldt alternatively 
sought below, and also alternatively seeks here, the very process that Plaintiffs 
claim has been denied them. Schvaneveldt requested that the trial court hold a 
hearing to consider and weigh the Quinlan evidence. (R. 7319.) At the hearing, 
Plaintiffs would have the opportunity to test the reliability and credibility of the 
Quinlan evidence by the usual methods, including cross-examination and the 
submission of countervailing evidence. The district court refused to hold such a 
hearing. It is to address this very point that Schvaneveldt has requested, as 
alternative relief in this appeal, that this Court reverse the district court on this 
point and remand for a further hearing on the matter. 
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No party with standing brought this action. The plaintiff ReMax Elite dba 
was owned by Quinlan, who never sued under the contract, and who is not a party 
to either the FSBO or the REPC. At the time the claim for a commission was first 
made in this action, the dba had expired. While this defect might have been 
curable, that never happened. Even joinder of additional parties (such as Wing) 
~ later on did not cure the dba' s inability to sue, since ( 1) the dba was expired, and 
(2) none of the added plaintiffs owned the dba anyway. 
B. The Plaintiffs cannot cure the standing defect or show standing on 
appeal because one of the defendants, Still Standing Stable, has 
now acquired both the ReMax Elite dba and all rights of its 
former owner, Dale Quinlan. 
After the verdict was entered in this case, Quinlan assigned all of his interest 
and the interest of his dba, ReMax Elite, in the FSBO agreement to Still Standing 
Stable. (R. 8138.) Quinlan also settled with the defendants all disputes regarding 
the FSBO, both personally and on behalf of the dba that he owned when the 
contracts at issue were signed. (R. 8126, 8142.) Additionally, in 2014, Still 
Standing Stable registered the available ReMax Elite dba as part of the sale and 
transfer from Quinlan. (R. 8207-08.) 
Through these events, Still Standing Stable now is the only entity with the 
standing to pursue ReMax Elite's commission claim against itself and 
V) Schvaneveldt. This Court has recognized that such an assignment, and, a fortiori, 
disposition of a cause of action, can occur. Lamoreaux v. Black Diamond 
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Holdings, 2013 UT App 32, 296 P.3d 780. Such a transfer of rights "cuts off the 
former plaintiffs right to pursue" judgment. Id., ,I 22. In this regard, the district 
court erred by stating that Quinlan's settlement merely created an "issue of fact." 
(An issue which, significantly, the district cowt still chose not to address.) With 
the registration of the ReMax Elite dba, and assignment of the former owner's 
rights and other choses in action, Still Standing Stable now has the right to cut off 
permanently any further proceedings relating to the judgment. Accordingly, the 
Plaintiffs lack standing to maintain this action against the Defendants. 
C. Under Rule 60(b ), the evidence supporting the acquisition of the 
dba was dispositive so as to deprive the court of subject matter 
jurisdiction, or was at least sufficient to overturn the judgment 
and allow for further proceedings. 
Schvaneveldt filed a Rule 60(b) motion below, citing Rule 60(b)(4) (the 
judgment was void), Rule 60(b)(5) (the matter had been settled and discharged), 
and Rule 60(b )( 6)(there were grounds otherwise to grant post-judgment relief). He 
also raised fraud and deception, which provide a basis for relief under Rule 
60(b )(3 ). The assignment of the dba and causes of action from Quinlan to Still 
Standing was grounds for any of these bases for relief to issue, whether the effect 
was to overturn the judgment and strike the complaint, or overturn the judgment 
and allow for further proceedings to develop the evidence concerning standing and 
mootness. 
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z. Schvaneveldt was diligent in presenting evidence and law 
depriving the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. 
A common theme in the district court's analysis of the Rule 60(b) arguments 
was diligence and timeliness. Accordingly, Schvaneveldt treats diligence 
preparatory to discussing each subsection individually. 
Schvaneveldt presented evidence of lack of standing below early and often. 
The evidence is significant because it speaks to two crucial issues confronting the 
court: standing (which is a derivative of jurisdiction) and mootness. Any evidence 
conc~ming standing should have been considered, especially given that the 
Plaintiffs had the burden to demonstrate their standing. Brown v. Div. of Water 
VP Rights of the Dep't of Natural Res. of Utah, 2010 UT 14, ,I14, 228 P.3d 747. If 
during the proceedings evidence demonstrates that that burden has not been met, 
the court is divested of subject matter jurisdiction. Wash. Cnty. Water Conservancy 
Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, 82 P.3d 1125. 
Relatedly, the facts presented by the Rule 60(b) motion render this case 
moot. "Generally, 'a case is deemed moot when the requested judicial relief 
cannot affect the rights of the litigants."' Tillotson v. Meerkerk, 2015 UT App 142 
19, --- P.3d. --- (citing Burkett v. Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989)). 
Mootness, like standing, goes to the court's jurisdiction. If a case is moot, no 
~ controversy is pending before the court, and the court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction. Acquiring the dba and rights of action from Quinlan effects a merger 
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of the claimant with the claimee, thus rendering further prosecution of the claim 
moot. As noted above, this is a common occurrence with legal effect. Lamoreaux 
v. Black Diamond Holdings, 2013 UT App 32,296 P.3d 780. 
To protect its rights, Still Standing could be expected to do no less than 
acquire the dba if it was available. The series of events and transactions leading up 
to Still Standing's acquisition of the dba rendered moot any claims Plaintiffs 
asserted in the dba, since the owner of the dba is merged with the same entity 
asserting claims against the dba. 
The Rule 60(b) motion was thus a final attempt to persuade the district court 
to consider the standing argument, given that not only had the Plaintiffs failed to 
demonstrate that they had standing, but their case had become moot. 
Schvaneveldt filed his Rule 60(b) motion based in part on the significant 
developments arising late in 2012 and into the summer of 2013: Quinlan's coming 
forward with the relevant facts surrounding the (non)transfer of the dba, the Utah 
Department of Commerce's renunciation of the assignment of the dba from 
Quinlan to Aspenwood, and the subsequent transfer of the dba to Still Standing 
Stable, L.C. (this last fact being the most significant, since it moots Plaintiffs' 
claims). 
Quinlan's role in this case was apparent very late, thanks in large part to 
Wing's concealment of that role. Quinlan's name first appeared in the record on a 
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huge ReMax letterhead as a mere agent, not a broker. (R. 21.) Shea mentioned him 
in passing in his deposition as the first principal broker under which Shea worked; 
this discussion mentioned nothing about the dba or Quinlan's ownership or transfer 
of it. (R. 1216.) Wing, in his deposition, states that Quinlan was "out of the 
picture," (R. 5820), does not list Quinlan as part of the ReMax owners' group in 
discovery responses. (R. 7369), and falsely claimed that Aspenwood owned the 
dba at the time the contracts were signed. (R. 7304-05, 7354.) Schvaneveldt's 
attention was drawn to Quinlan when Wing began to deny that he was a party to 
the lawsuit in order to avoid paying costs and attorney fees; the district court 
acknowledged as much. (R. 7012.) Wing's protest finally allowed Schvaneveldt 
to see the significance of Quinlan's role, completing the puzzle-earlier in the 
litigation Schvaneveldt argued that Wing and the other Plaintiffs lacked standing, 
but now it was clear who really did have standing. So Still Standing acquired 
those rights in standing to moot the case, as allowed under Black Diamond, supra 
p. 25. 
Plaintiffs below argued that Schvaneveldt could have figured all of this out 
earlier in the case. (R. 7459.) They do not say how. The only fact that could have 
been known before the time of the litigation was Quinlan's censure, (R. 73 73 ), 
which by itself was meaningless ( and which was actually concealed in discovery 
responses (R. 7360)). His censure did not mean he was prevented from lawfully 
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transferring the dba. Quinlan's involvement and the events surrounding the 
forgery of his signature were obscure and difficult to ascertain. The documents in 
the public record at the Commercial Division, R. (7329-31 ), and that were the basis 
for the assignment to Still Standing Stable, appeared on their face to be legitimate, 
and under the law are presumed to be so. See Utah Code 42-2-7(2) ("A copy of . 
any such certificate certified by the Division of Corporations and Commercial 
Code shall be presumptive evidence of the facts contained in the certificate."). 
Thus, contrary to Plaintiffs' contention, and contrary to the district court's express 
refusal to even consider them, the Division's certificate showing Quinlan owned 
the ReMax Elite dba was binding on the district court. 
Moreover, hampering Schvaneveldt's ability to conduct due diligence was 
Wing's active concealment of Quinlan's role. He acknowledged Quinlan's 
previous broker status but denied Quinlan's current relevance. In this respect 
Wing committed fraud through partial disclosure, and took upon· himself at that 
point a duty to disclose the entire truth, and not merely a part of it. First Sec. Bank 
of Utah N.A. v. Hanberry Dev. Corp., 786 P.2d 1326, 1330-31 (Utah 1990). 
Accord Specialty Beverages, LLC, v. Pabst Brewing Co., 537 F.3d 1165, 1181 
(10th Cir. 2008)( duty arises in one selectively disclosing facts in order to mislead); 
Union Pac. Res. Grp., v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 247 F.3d 574, 584 (5th Cir. 2001). 
That duty was enhanced through Wing's obligation to testify truthfully in his 
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deposition and to answer completely and truthfully discovery requests. This he did 
not do. Schvaneveldt vigorously argued these points below. (R. 7311-19.) 
Thus, as is often the case, it was not any single event that revealed the 
Plaintiffs' duplicity, but the events taken collectively. lt was not the dots, it was 
the connect.ions, connections that Wing himself denied ever making. (R. 8094.) 
Those connections did not become clear until Quinlan himself provided the 
essential information through his declaration. Thus, to say that this information 
was freely available or discoverable is not true. Even so, and significantly, the 
district court did not distinguish which parts of the evidence presented in the Rule 
60(b) motion were available or not, or why. Despite the district court's lack of 
guidance or rationale, the course of proceedings shows both how evidence 
surrounding jurisdiction was presented early and often, and how there was a clear 
scheme to claim ownership of the dba and to cover up its true nature. See pp. 14-
15, supra. The Commercial Division was clearly not impressed with this scheme, 
VP and acted to undo it. (Compare forgery examples at R. 7346 and R. 7347, both of 
which materially impacted the effect of the $4.3 million REPC). 
To this lastpoint, agency action, the district court did not assess the issues 
surrounding the Division's process for authorizing a dba transfer or validating a 
dba registration. Nor did it give any credence or deference to that action, as it was 
required by law to do. See pp. 28-30, supra. The district court did not, in its ruling, 
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cite a single case, statute or administrative rule on the issues with which it raised 
concerns. 
Thus, there was no single piece of evidence that was a smoking gun 
revealing Quinlan -was the true party in interest as the owner of the dba. 6 At first, 
the only thing Schvaneveldt knew or could have known was that the Plaintiffs 
certainly did not have standing; who actually did have that standing was unknown 
(and perhaps no one did, for all Schvaneveldt knew). Then, piece by piece, 
Schvaneveldt discovered individual shreds of evidence relating to who did and 
who did not have standing and attempted to introduce them to the district court, 
each time his attempt at relief being denied. Things accelerated quickly soon after 
the trial. With Wing's insistence that he was not party, the true nature of Quinlan's 
ownership became clear; he, like Schvaneveldt, was duped by the Plaintiffs; his 
signature had been forged; and the state was willing to act on this evidence to 
modify the corporate assignation of the dba. Out of this connection came the most 
telling piece of evidence: the assignment of the dba to Still Standing. This was 
enough, under any reading of the rule, to demonstrate Schvaneveldt' s diligence 
under the rule, as it not only bolstered the notion that Plaintiffs lacked standing, but 
6 As noted, supra pp. 4-7, Schvaneveldt had long argued that Plaintiffs lacked 
standing. Quinlan's role as the true party in interested provided the missing link, 
and in that respect was compelling. 
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mooted the case. But the district court, with cursory analysis, a priori assumed 
that the evidence did not warrant consideration, and thus denied the motion. 
In short, the district court was required to assess the facts that Schvaneveldt 
raised in the Rule 60(b) motion, but chose not to act. It did so when the facts 
revealed to the court were on their face novel, plausibly and timely revelatory, and 
highly relevant to effecting the legislature's intent behind the dba registration and 
commission law. Most important, they were raised in a manner compliant with 
the rule's requirement of due diligence. The facts raised in the motion effectively 
mooted the case, as a matter of law. 
zz. Relief should have been granted under Rule 60(b)(3). 
Rule 60(b )(3) provides for relief from a judgment when that judgment is 
based upon fraud. As rehearsed supra pp. 28-31, Wing and the other plaintiffs 
actively concealed Quinlan's role as owner of the dba ReMax Elite. They were 
compelled to do so in order to preserve their own claim to standing, inconsistent as 
it was with Quinlan's unique position as the only person actually with standing. 
As such, relief under Rule 60(b )(3) was erroneously denied by the district court. 
Rule 60(b )(3) also contemplates development of further evidence if a 
colorable claim of fraud is presented to the court. In Ty Inc. v. Softbelly 's, Inc., 
353 F.3d 528, 537 (7th Cir. 2003). The court held that the district court had abused 
its discretion when it failed to hold an evidentiary hearing despite conflicting 
33 
evidence of fraud. As an alternative to striking the judgment and entering judgment 
for Schvaneveldt, the district court should have conducted such a hearing. This 
Court, as an alternative basis for relief, can remand this matter to the district court 
to conduct ~uch a hearing incident to which the parties should be permitted to 
conduct discovery. 
m. Relief should have been granted under Rule 60(b)(4). 
Rule 60(b )( 4) provides for relief from a judgment that is void. Standing is a 
matter of subject matter jurisdiction. A judgment entered by a court that lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction is not merely voidable. It is void, since the tribunal 
lacked the power to act from the first instant. See Van Der Stappen v. Van Der 
Stappen, 815 P.2d 1335 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (reversing trial court's decision not 
vacate judgment under the predecessor to Rule 60(b )( 4 ), where evidence produced 
for the first time after entry of a decree of divorce established that the trial court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction under then-applicable law). Here, the Plaintiffs 
lacked standing, and thus the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Quinlan's 
declaration, separate and apart from the equally damning assignment to the dba and 
letter from the Commercial Division, was enough to demonstrate that the Plaintiffs 
lacked standing and that, therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction. Read 
together, this evidence renders the conclusion inescapable. 
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iv. Relief should have been granted under Rule 60(b)(5). 
Rule 60(b )(5) is the applicable to a situation like this one where through 
assignment the claim is extinguished through merger. It states expressly that its 
roots are in equity. It is inequitable to enforce a judgment that no longer applies. 
Moreover, the court lacks the power to do so. As such, relief should have been 
VP granted under Rule 60(b )(5). As noted, supra pp. 25-26, post judgment assignment 
of a cause of action can moot a case through merger. That is precisely what 
occurred here. 
v. Relief should have been granted under Rule 60(b)(6). 
Rule 60(b )( 6) provides a district court with the means to relieve a party from 
a judgment upon equitable grounds not otherwise specifically enumerated by Rule 
60(b ). If the relief Schvaneveldt seeks does not fit in to any of the grounds already 
argued, Rule 60(b )( 6) applies. The stark facts of this case mandate such a result. 
The Plaintiffs proceeded in derogation of statutes specifically protecting the public 
from unscrupulous real estate vendors ( the broker statute) and those attempting to 
hide their true identities (the dba statute). They actively concealed their conduct 
throughout the litigation. When, finally, the true facts emerged, the other shoe fell: 
not only was it conclusively revealed that they lacked standing, but that standing 
was shown to be clearly vested in another, Quinlan. Quinlan settled his claim and 
mooted the case. Perhaps these events do not precisely constitute fraud as 
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contemplated under Rule 60(b )(3 ), or do not precisely render the judgment void 
under Rule 60(b )( 4), or do not precisely extinguish the judgment under Rule 
60(b )(5). But they are certainly a basis to vacate the judgment under the equitable 
principles enumerated under the rule. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
The FSBO has an attorney fee provision (the same provision cited by the 
Plaintiffs when they received an award of attorney fees against Schvaneveldt). 
Add.Exh. 1 § 8. Plaintiffs lack standing. Accordingly, this Court should remand 
with instructions to enter judgment for Schvaneveldt. In that event, or if the Court 
remands for other purposes, it should provide that, should Schvaneveldt prevail on 
remand, he is entitled to attorney fees incurred in this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Appellant Schvaneveldt respectfully 
requests that the Court reverse the judgment and instruct the trial court to enter 
judgment in favor of Schvaneveldt as a matter of law. Alternatively, the Court 




Pursuant to, and to the extent permitted by, U.R.A.P. 24(i), Schvaneveldt 
adopts by reference arguments by Schvaneveldt in case 20130746-CA which also 
relate to the liability of Schvaneveldt and coextensive claims. 
DATED this 15th day of July, 2015. 
C~S~E~ JENSEN, P.C. -~~~ 
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Exhibit 1 
For Sale By Owner Commission Agreement 
& Agency Disclosure (FSBO) 
: 61"4/2'00'9 10! .;a: 44 27G1 
._._ •- V""' ,,.._. • •· 
·.·•, .,,.,u ,,."'~"..,,\.ti,,.,. P. 07/08 
JAN-20-2006 FRI 11:50 AM FAX NO. 
FOR SALE BY OWNER COMMISSION AGREEMENT & AGENCY DISCLOSURE 
Th°d i:n JfG~lty l:>f ndim CGl'ttt.x:L If you dcwro logal DT blC actlioc, c:oru..c.ll rcnn- aitofnO\' Ot' ta.l acsvic.or. 
1. THIS COMMISSION AGREEMENT Js ~ntercd into on this 2Q1h_ day of January. ZOOfi:_., between Be./Mit!< Elite 
r. •.WC,~ Lbeyton 'Branch) (the "Company-). including Tirn Shea (the "Agent'") as the authorize<J _agen~ for the Company, and 
~,AlJs~urtl<hlfCk and Cathy Cod~ (the ·s·euer") for real property ownod by Seller descnbed a& foUows: Es<?~J # 
. ZJ-006-0006 Huntsyme Ut 8431 O lthe "Property"). . . 
2. BROKERAGE FEE. Ttle ~lier agrees tr:> p;ay the Company. Irrespective of agency relatonshl,D(s), as compensation 
for services, a Brokerage Fee in the amount of s _______ or .a% of tho acquisition price of 1t'IP. P(Operty, If tho 
Seller tjCCl!P~ 3n otr&r trom E000Jfc~t Wilrren Wlsl or AsslgG.§ (the .. Buy8f). or anyone acting on the Buyer's behalf, 
to purcha6e or exchange 1he Property. The Seller ag~ U\al \he Brokerage fee sha\l be doo and payable,. from the 
proceeds of the Seher, on the date of recortfir,g of c:IOMg documents for the purchase or exchange of the Property by the 
Buyer or anyono adfng on the Buyer's behart. ff the safe or exchange is prevttnte<f by defaurt of tnc Seller, th8 Brokerage 
Fee shall immediately be due and payable to the Company. 
~. PROTECTio>J PERIOD. rr Within .2 montns sftM this Cotnr11issioo Agr~rnent ,s entered into. me Property is acquired 
by the Buyer, or anyone acting 011 the Buyer's b&half, the SelJer agrees to pay the Company th!! Brokerage Foe stated in 
Section 2. The Saller agrees to ~empt the Buyer upoo entering in~ a valid Otting agreement with ~nother b,okt:raoe . 
. 4, SELl..9? WARRANTII:.SJ0ISCLOSURf.S. The Seller warriJnt!i that the indiviau~s I.Jr entf1y listed above as tt}e "Seller'' 
represents all of the record owners of tt1e Property. n,e SeUer warrants that it has marketabte dtJe and an es~hti~ti~d 
ri!Jht 10 sell, le.a.so, or C>Cehange the Property. ll>e Sefler agrees to execute me n80eS,!;ary dor.,,ments: Qf convoyanc;c. The 
Soller n~e-s to t\Jurfstt bUyM v.,f(h good and mariwt.iblo t111e, Dnd to psy at Sett1emen1. fOt' a S13ndard coverage owner's 
poUcy of tilfe insurance for the buyer in the amoum of the pun:h~ prlce. The Soiler agraos 10 fuUy inform the Agenl 
r&gardlnsi the Seller's Jcnnwlooge of tha condltlon or the Proporty. illt: SeUer agrees ro personally complete and ,;ion~ 
RRJI~(-. Pro~rty Condioon DixtostJre foon 
5. AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS. By sigrang thta Commission Agreernem, fl)') Sel~ acknowloog~ end ClgnfflS l)la\ Uu~ 
Age111 and tM Prlt'lcipatn:Jranch Broker for the Company (tne ""Brokaf1 ore rcprJ!SMCng ttir: Buyl."f'. As tM Buyer's Agent. 
they wfll act consistent with th~ir fidc.,eigry dU1io:; ta tho Buyer of IOYHIIY, full cttsctosure. confidcnliality1 and reasonable 
care. ThA SP.ltP,( acknowledge& that the Company amJ U1e Agent have a<tv1sed the Setler that m~ ~~l~r is cntiUod to be 
repreoonted' by a real est.ate o;1s,nm1 th~t VJIII represanl tha Sener cxcfuAfvP.ly. The Seller has-however. elected not to lH:! 
repr~~tmled by a rtal estate agent in this ~- Tho Seller further ackrlawieuge-s aoo agrees that aJI actions of the 
Company and the Agent even th~ that as5ist'tho Seller In performing or wmpletlng an}' of lhe Seller's contractual or 
legal oblig:UIC\('\S. ,nc {ntentloo fur 11\c bt>ncl1\ oftt,e Suyi!r exdustvety. I hri. Commssion Agreeomnt ms not roquiro lhc,. 
Comp3ny or lhe Agen1 to solit:1 u(rcrs on t116 Prope-rty from the Boyet, nor d~ i1 ::u1th'lrize th9 Compony or the Agent to 
30Ucn offers r,om i;1ny otnef porscm or ~otitv. 
6. PRO .. 'ESSIONAL ADVICE. ThP. C?mp=.iny and t.hu /\gent' Ifft: ttaine<l irr Um m.111(etino of roal est6le. Neither lhP: 
CompD'lY, nr,r ft,e Ag,:nl aro t.J.Jinctf lo provi1fo llld St.!llcr or ;my prospucfivc buyer with lcg.jf ot tax ;u1vi,;.e,, or wilh 
t9chnl~al advico rogurdirrg the physl~l u.mtlfUon or tt,~ t>roPtJrtv. H tho Scflur do-;n-~s f-\dvio-: regatdil"lg! (i) paJt or prc1ont 
cornpll.::nc:e \'-'ilf1 C:.U."1ing &:')(7 Duil<Jmg codn rcqulr'Clr..ants; (ii) t.,9.\I or 1:1x n1nt?tln.: (iii) tno pl~cal c.oncJitiun of the Pt°'1etty; 
{Jv). ll'li.s Cummi:;:;ion Anre¢1llent or (v) any tr~ns:.it.'tic.>n for mo :icquiaition of the Prv~urty. tne Agent and the Company 
STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT THE SELLER O0fAIN SUCH INDEPENOE.N I ADVICE. IF rHE SELlFR FAILS TO 
no sp, THE SELLER 16 ACTING CONTRAAYTO THE AOVlCE OF THE COMPANY . 
. 7. OfSPUTt: RE.SOLUTION. Tne partfo, ~tee that any di:i;iutP., .Jrhit19 prior to or ofter a ·closing rul;~lt.!d to mrs 
CurnmJsSfon Aun..~rnant. shell (irsl be nubmitt,>':f tu m<:di.1tion lh,ovyh u meoiatlon piuvic.tcr rntJl\Jally agroed upcn by (ho 
parti8s. If the p;1rtiR~ ~nnot :191"\!e upon a rncdiotion prnvicJr:i, lite dispute shall bil submitlcd to dir1 Amnri~ri .Arbl1rcitian 
.A.s~oci;ition, Each p,nty agrcQ to lJ~1 iLs uwi1 r..m;fs ot rneqbtion. Ir ,ncdiation falls, th,: nth,:lt µl\'.>ceduror. and rcmc tire~ 
ev.:Jil.1blc under !his Agre~iuent shaU apply. · · 
0. ATTORNEY H:::ES. Except as oroviden in Sod.ion 71 in 3ny ~ction or proceecJi11y arisJng oui at trits Commission 
Agrocmonl Involving Che Sellttr -::rr,d/or lite ComP30Y. lhe preV21iling pa,ly i:;Jl.aU be entitled to reasonable ellamey fAP.~ and 
costs. 
9. Sl=LLER AUTHORJl'.A Tl• NS. Thu Comp~ny tS outhorizod to dlSClose Rff~r dosing the fin3I terms and ~,es prk;~ ur 
the Property to the. foliow1110 Mult.iplo, (:;.ting Sc,vico: ~lA1.l~uaf Ml ~ 
10. f,TTACHMENT. There { ) /\HE {,(J A.Rt: NOl" ~Lh.Jillanal terms lo this Commission Agrnr.m~nt. If "ya&·, soo 
Ao:idendum _____ Jncorporntr,tf into \hit ComrntS'5ion Agreement by thls refemnc:e. 
11. EQUAL HOUSING OPPORTUmry. S<?lle, ~nd rhc Co.nrAny-agreo lo comply W1th FeCSercSI, 3t8lt1, c!Fld local fait 
huuslng laws. . 
12. FAXl:.s. F~mile (fax) transmission of a signed copy at thfs Commission Agreement. and retransmtsslon of a signed 
rax, sflalf t>e the same as delivery of an original. tf lhls bonsadion involves multiple ov.mP.r.=. this Commission Agreement 
may bo cxcoiled in counteJ pc1rts. 
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P. 08/08 
13, EmlRE A.GREEM ENT. This Commission Agreernent. lnclUdil'\g lM Seller's Proper1)' CondiUon Olsdosur~ form. 
contain the entire agreement between the parties relating to the subject matter of this Commission Agreement. This 
Commission Agreement may no1 be modified or amended except ln Writing sigood by the parties hemta. 
~~,NED do h~rsby agree 10 the terms of 1hls Commi$slon A9rt6meot as of tho dace 1il'S1 aboVf> written. 
,~ ----(Beliefs Signo!uro) (Se!far's Signature) 
Chuck and Cathy Coda 
ThoCo~Q 
By/ . l c:: ~--- Bv; __________ _ 
(AuCholl2od Agnnt) • (PrindpaUl3ranch Broker) 
Tim Shea M. Scctt Quinney 
COJ"YH/GUTU UTAJt t\.6SOCl'\TIOH OF REJ.1.TORS&-1000 REV1SED 7.A,04 /.t.L fUQIH& RESERV£D 
Paoe 2 or 2 UA~ FORM 68 
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Exhibit 2 
Real Estate Purchase Contract-Land (REPC) 
••: 
.,f 
FEB-06-2006 l10N 02:46 PM FAX HO. 
P. 02 
REAL::ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT-- LAND 
'Thlo I• 1t "'1faHyJllndlng ciipnlr.l(;t. U ~u ctnl111 lag.I er ux •~h:!, Cb11~utt your .inorn•y o,r to.x odvl5or. 
EARNEST ~~NEY RECEIPT 
Buyer Emmett Wa,mn and or As"slqns offers to purchese the Property described b~low and h1,reby d~llvers 10 the 
.. arokerago, ch;·Eamtsl Money, the amount of~ in lhe form of QHE~K which, upon Acceptanco of ttils offer by an 
partJqs (es defln&d In Sectlon 23), ahall be doposlled In accordance with &tale law. 
·Received b~ ------------,....----:--:~~- on __________ (Oate) 
~•turt ;f ~ Kk11awlqN l"Cl(llll,j:I\ vf E11r,a,I Mcm,y) 
. Brokerage: Re/MaX Etlte { Layton Branch ) Phone Number. flQ1-82~-370Q 
OFfER TO PµRCHASE 
·1. PROPERTY: lend LLC, sun 'standjng $tables also described as! earcet # 23-006-00Q2 Chy of Hvotsvme ·. · ·. .. :-- _ 
.. County of~ State of Utah, ZIP &1ll (lhe •Property"). 
1,1 lncludod atom~. (spoetry} ______________________ :-------
1.2 Water RJght:./Water Shan,., The followlrtg water rights and/or water share, ere Included In tfle Purchese -Price. H----Shares of Stock In the _______________ (Name of Water Company) 
·[XJ other (specify) All rjghts attached to the property and or pertaloiog to the property,. 
,2 •. PURCH.ASE PRICE The purchase pr1ce for the Property is $4362500 
· Tho purd'la~e price will be paid as follows: 
S2SJll!Q (a) Earneat Money Deposit. Under certain cttnditlons deacrtbad In this Contract THIS 
. DEPOSIT MAY BECOME TOTALLY NON-REFUNDABLE. · 
$. _____ (b) New Laan. Buyer ~grees to apply for: one or more of the following loans: 
~ [X] CONVEtrnONAL [ ] OTHER (specJfy) _____________ _ 
If the lean ls·ta lnciude any particular terms, then check below end give details: [ J SPECIFI_C LOAN 'TERMS ___________________ _ 
$. _____ (i:) Seller Financing. (iee altached Soller Financing Addanctum. If applicable) 
$ (cf) Other (•pacify). · 
$ (e) Balanoo of Purch88a Pr1co in Cash et Sattlomenl 
S436250Q PURCHASE PRICE. Total ttf Unoa (o) thraugh (e) 
3. SETTLEME!NT ANO CLOSING. Settlement iman take place on the Settlement Deadline referenced Ir, Section 24(c), or 
on a date upon which Buyer and Saller agroo In writing. •setuement" shall occ~r only when aJI of the tollowing have been 
completed: (a) Buyer and Seller have slgned and delivered to each 01her or to the cscrow/cfoslng office all documents 
required by this Contract, by lhe Lender, by written escrow lnstruct1ons or by appllcable law; (b) any monies required to be 
paid by Buyer under theso documents (exeapt for the proceeds of any new loan} have been deUvered by Buyer to Seller 
or ta the escrow/closlng offica ln the form of collectect or cleared funds; and (c) any monies required to be paid by Seller 
under these documents have bean delivered by SeJler lo Buyer or to the escrow/closrng office In the fonn of collected or 
cleared fundo. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half(¼) of lhe fee charged by tfle escrow/closll'lg office ror Its 
services In the eettlemenVc\oslng process. Taxes and assessment& for Iha rurrent year, rents, and Interest on assumed 
obllgatlons shall be prorated et Settlement as set forth In this Section, Prorattons set forth In this Section shall be made as 
of ttl9 Settlement Deadline date referenced In Section 24(c). unfass otherwfse agreed to In writing by the parties. Such 
writing could Include the settlement statement. The transaction wfll bo considered closed when Settlement has been 
completed, and when all of the foUow(ng have been comploted: {Q the proeeeds of ariy new loan have been delivored by 
the Lender to Seller or to the ascrow/clcsing office: end (ii) the oppllcable Closlng documents hav" Ileen-recorded In tho 
office of the county recorder. The actions described in parts (I) and {II) of the preceding sentence nhall b'R completed 
within four calendar days of semement 
4, POSSESSION, Seller shall deliver physical possession to Buyor within: [X] Upon Closing ( J Othur (specffy) 
6, CONFIRMATION OF A~~! _?fSClOSURE, At the signing of tills contract: 
l ] Sellor'a lniti11ls ~yer'a lnltle_ls . 
Paee 1 '1f 5 pnge• SeU11,.& lnlti~ C 5 Data Z- 7., o(. Buyer's In~ Dute k '• C, 6 
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.Usting Agent ____________ _, r~presents [ J Self or [ J Buyer [ ] both Buyer and Sell9r 
· . · as a1l:.imlt4Jd Agent; 
Listing Broker for . represents [ J Safier [ ] Bl:lyer ( .J°.boih 81.1Ycir,.an:d·.~1mar 
(Company Name) ~i.a Llmlt~-AQ'~_nti 
Btiyor's Agont Tim Shea, represents ( J Sailor ( ] Buyer I ] both Buyer and sonar 
· · as a Lfmf tad Agent; . 
. Buyer'& Broker for ·Romax Elite ( SCQtt Oulpney), repres~nts [ l Saner [Xl Buyar [ J.both .auy~r un_d'Sell~r · ... : 
· {Company Name) as a Umlted Agent: 
6, TITLE INSURANCE. At S~,ttlement. Seller agrees to pay for a staridard-ooverage owner's policy of tl~~·ln~u~nce 
Insuring Buy~tln th, amoun·t or the Purchasa Prlce. Any addlllonal Utle Insurance cov~rage shall boat Buyet.6·.exp~n~. 
7, SELLER DlSCl.OS.URES, No li1ter ~an the Seller DlsdoS!:JrC.DeadDne referenced In Section 2-4(8), S~ller sh.aH_ ptO\Jide · 
· to Buyer the followtng dotuments·.whlch. are eollecllvely referred to ~s the ·seller Olsclostrres": · · 
·· (a) a Seller property ·condltlon dlscfosuro for the Property, $igned and dated by Seller: / 
.... (I>) ·a commhment'.for the poUcy of .title Insurance; 
. ~(c) a oopy of any rcai;es effettlng llW Property not expiring prior to Closing; 
•. (d) wrttten notice of any cfalms andf0r conditions lcnown IQ Seller relati,:ig to envirorvncnlal prob(ems; 
·· (o) evidence· of any water righta and/or water shares reference<J in Section 1.2 above: and 
:{f) 01her (specify) ______________________ .;._,.. ___ __ 
IJ, BUYER'S RIGHT TO CANCEL BASED ON BUYER'S DUE DILIGENCE, Buyer's obllgatlon to purchase undor this 
Contract {check 1pp1Jcqbl• boxos): 
(a) [XJ IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's flpproval of the content of au the Sellftr Disclosures referenced In 
Sec0on7~ 
(1)) [XJ IS f J IS NOT COl!lditioned upon Buyel'a approvaJ of a physical condition Inspection of the Propef'tr. 
(c) I ] JS [X] JS NOT conditioned upon Buyere approval of a ,uivey of the Pr0perty by a Rcensed surveyor; 
· (d) [X] IS [ J IS NOT condltlon~d upon Buye(s approval of applicable federal, state and k>C411 gqvemmental lawa, 
ordinances and regult1tfons effecting the Property; and any applicable deed restrictions and/or CC&R1s (covenan1s, 
r""\ condUlonc and restrictions)' affecting lho Prop11rty; ~ 
(e) IX] IS [ ] JS NOT conditioned upon the Property appraising for not le&s then the Pumhase. Price; . 
(f) (X] IS [ J IS NOT aondlltoned upon Suyeta approval of the terms end condltfons of any mortgage financing 
referoncod In Suc11on 2 above: 
(g)-[X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer'• approval of the folloWlng tests and evah.1atJon~ ofthe·Prop"rty: 
(specify) 
Salt Jest 
If any of Items 8(a) through 8(g) ore checked fn the efflrmatlvc, then Sections 8.1 1 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4 apply; otherwise, they 
do not apply. Th& Items checked Jn the affirmative above ere collecUvvly referntd to as Buyet's "Due Oillgence.u Unless 
othorwlse provided In this Contract. Buyer's Due Dillgenca !hall be paid for by Buyer end shall be conducted by 
lndJvJduals or entitles of Buyer's choice. Seller agrees to cooperate with Buyer's Due Diligence and with a final pf"l-closlng 
Inspection under Suction 11. 
B.1. Dua Dllfgenco Oeadllne. No later than the Due Dlllgence Deadline rereronced In Section 24(b) Buyer shall: (a) 
complete an of Buyer's Due Olligonce; end (b) detennlne if the re,ults of Buyets Dua On!genoe arc acceptable to Buyer, · 
8.2 Right to Cnnc:•I or ObJert If Buyer d11tennlne1 tha1 the results of Buyer'a Cue DnJgence ere unscceptabfo, Buyer 
may, no later than the Due Ollli,ence Deadline, either: (a) cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Seifer, 
whereupon th• Earnest Money Deposit shall bt releascsd to Buyer; or (b) provide Seller with written noUc. a( obje~tions. 
8.3 FalJure to Respond. If by the e~pfratlon of lho Due Diligence 0$adllnc, Buyer does not: (a) cancel .this Contract 
as provided in Suction e.2~ or (b) def Iver a written objection to Seller regarding the Buyer"s Due Diligence, lhe Buyer'1 
Due Dllfgence ahall be deemed approved by Buyer: and the contingencies referenced In Ssctlons 6(a) through 8(g), 
Including hut not limited to, ony financing contingency, shall be deemed waived by Buyor. · 
8,4 Rasponao by Sailor, If Buyer provides wr1tten obJecttons to Seller, Buyer and Seller shall have seven calendar 
r:SB)'$ after $oiler's receipt of Buyer's objectlono (the •Response Period·) In which to agree in writing upon the manner of 
r8$0tvlng Buyer's objections. Except as provided In Svctlon 10.2, Seller may, but shall not be roqutred 101 resolve Buysr's 
obJoctfonlf. If Buyer .and seller have not agreed In writing upon the manner ot resolvlng Buyer's objecllons, Buyer may 
cancel this Con!nsct by providing written notice lo Seller no taler then lhreo calendar days 1ner expiration of the Response 
Period; whDreupon the Eame&l Money Deposit shall bo released to Buyer. If this Contraet JCi not canceled by Buyer under 
this Sectlon 8.4, Buyer's objection, • hell be deemed waived by Buyer. This waiver uhall not affect tho.so IWms warranted 
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In Seet!or, 10. 
9. ADDfTIONAL TERMS. There f J ARE [ J ARE NOT nddenda to this Contract containing additional terms. If _there are, 
.. ·. •lh~ terms of the following .addenda are lnoorp~rated into lhls Contract by this reference: [ J Addonda .No/a __ .·_. __ _ 
•[ ] Soller Anara~tng A~dsndum [ ] Othor .(specify) ____________________ _ 
10. SELLER WARRANTIES AND REPRESf!NTATIONS. 
10.1 Condition of Titla. Seller represents that Seller has fee 1ltle 10 the Property and will convey good and malketable 
tJUe to Buyer at Closlng by genera( warranty deed. Buyer agrees, however, lo accept 11t1e to lhe Property tubJeot to the 
fOllowing matters of record: easements, deed restrictions. CC&R's (meaning covenants, condJUons •nd rettrfdlons), and 
rfgtrts-ot-way; and &UbJoet to the contents of the Commitment for TIUe lnsuranco as agreed to by B~yer un~er Secllo~ 8. 
Buyer also agrees to take the Property subject to existing lease$ affecting the Property and not expiring pnor to Closing. 
Buyer agree$ to be responslble far taxes. assessments, homeowners association dues, utili\les. and other service$ 
provided to the Property after Closlng. Seller wlll cause to be-paid off by Closing all mortgages, trust deeds, Judgments, 
mecheriio's fiens, tax lions end warrants. Seller will cause to be paid current by Closing aJI ess"ssments and homeownera 
association dues. 
IF ANY PORTfON OF THE PROPERTY IS PRESENTLY ASSESSED AS "GREENBEL r' {CHECK APPLICABLE 
BOX): 
[X] B~LLE~. [ ] BUYER SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PAYMENT OF ANY ROLL-SACK TAXES AS~ESSED 
AGAINST THE PROPERTY. 
10.2 Condition of Ptoparty. Seller warrantc that the Property WIii be In the followlng condition ON THE DATE 
SELLER DELIVERS PHYSICAL POSSESSION TO BUYER: 
(a) the Property shall be free of debris and pursonel property. 
lb) lhe Propitrty wm be In the soma general condltJon as ll wa, on the date of Acceptance. 
11. FINAL PRE-CLOSING rNSPt;CTION. Bofore Settlement, Buyer may. upon raasonable notlce and at a reasonable 
time, condud a final pre-closing inspection of the Property to determine only that the Property Is "as represented," 
meanJng that the Property has been repaired/corrected as agreed to ln Section 8.4, and Is In the condition warranted in 
Socdon 10.2. If the Property Is not as represented, Seller wnl, prior to Settlement, repatr/cotrect the Proporty, and placo 
r'\ the Proparty In the warranted condition or with the consent of Buyer (and Lender tf appUeable) •. escrow en amount at 
Sett1cmant suffi~lent to provide for the samo. The f allure to condt.1ct a final pre-closing fnapeetlon or to claim that lhe 
Property Is note, ropresentcd, ahaU not constttute a waJver by Buyer of the right to recalvo, on the date of possasslon, the 
Property Bl represented. 
12. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. Seller agrees that from the date of Acceptance until tha date of Closing, none 
of tho foUOWlng shall occur without the prior written com"nt of Buyer: (a) no c:t1an90a In any exl•tJng loaaes shall be made; 
{b) no new leases shall be entered into: (c) no substantial arteratlom or Improvements to the Property s~all be made-or 
undertekvn; and (d) no furtner financial enoumbrance$ affecting the Prop~rty shall be made. 
13. AIJTHORJTY OF SIGNERS. If Buyer or St lier Is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate. limited Uabiflty company or 
01herentlty, lhe person executing this Contract on Rs behalf warrants his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer and 
Seller. 
14. CO,.,-PLETE CONTRACT. Thi& Contract togethar with Its addenda, any attached exhlbils 1 end Saller 0lsciosuras 1 
conatltutts tha ,ntlre Contract between tho parties and ,upersedus and replece3 any and all prior negotiations, 
representations, warranUee, undersland(ngs or contracts oetween the partle.s. This Contract cannot be ctu1nged e><~pt by 
written agreement of the parties. · 
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties agree that any dispute, ~rising prtor to or after Closlng, related to this Contract 
(chock appflcable box) 
[ ]SHALL 
[X] MAY AT THE OPTlOrf OF THE PARTIES 
first be tubmlttcd to mediation. Ir the parties agree to medlal1011, tha dfspute shall be submitted to mediatfan through e 
mediation provider mutually 119rued upon by the parUes. Each party agrees to beer Its own costs of meellaUon. If mediation 
falls, the other procedures and reme<fles avellable under this Contract shQII apply. Nothing In this Section 15 shall prohibit 
any party from aeeklng 11mergem:.y equitable reUef pending mediation. 
1 &. DEF.AULT. If Suyer defaults, Sellur may elect eltner to retain the Eemest Money Deposit as llquldated damages, or to 
return It and su~ Buyer to specifically enforce this Contract or puraua other romedle1 avaReble a1 tow. If Sellar defauhs, In 
addition to return of the Eam~t Money Deposl~ Buyer may olect ellhvr to eocept from Seller a sum equal to the Earnest 
Money Deposit e:s llquldated damages, or may sue Seller lo speclflcally enforce this Contract or pursue other roinedles 
available at law. If Buyer eJecii to accept liquidated damages. Seller agr&O$ to pay tho liquidated damages to Buyer upon 
1'<9&3 ors,_ Sole(& lnltialo e. :;: Dalu z · 7 , 0 6 Buye(s lnlU~<---c:::;= Dal& :z- b- <>b 
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demand. 
. · 17. -A TTOR_HEY FEES AN(? ~Q_S~. In the event of Dltgation or binding ~rbitratlon to enforce this Contract, ~e prevaHing 
. · party shall be enUllod to .C'Osts and reasonable attorney·fees. However, attorney fe1,s shafl riot.be awarded:ftirparticlpauon · 
-In inedleUon under Section· 16. · · 
· .-19. _NOTICES. Ex~pt as provided In SedJon 23, all notices _required und_er this Corttract must~be: (a).ln wrtUng;_(ti):}i~neti 
.by the party_givlng notice: and .(c) received by the other partY or the other party's agent no rater than.th·e appl1¢abf1i:.~ate 
·referenced In this CO,itrnct. · 
19 .. ABROGATtoN: Except for the provisions of Sections 10.1, 10.2.-15 and 17 and expre$$ .warra.nUes··m·at1e tn.thr, 
·Contract.· U\e provlslons of this Contract 9hall not apply after Closlng. · 
:20.JU_SK OF LOSSJ All rl$k of loss to th$ Property, fncludlng physical damage or destruction .to tha~Propartror.ita 
... lmpi'ovemenla duo to any cause.- uc_epl ordinary wear and tear and loss caused by a taking In eminent.domain,- shall be 
: borne by Seller untH the transa~tlon Is closed. 
·· ... 21. ilME IS bF THE ESSENCE. Tlme Is of tha essence regarding lhe date~ set forth in this Contract. Extensions must be 
· :a9raed-to Jn ~ting by ~II peiti_es. Unless ot~rwlse eXpllcitJy stated in this Contract~ (a) performanC(I under .each ~ectlon 
of this-Contract which-references a date shall absolutely be required by" 5:00 P.M Mountain Time on the stated .. dat'e;-and 
_- (b)'the term 'days• ~hell .me~n q1lei:,dar days and shall be r.ounl~d.begl~~ng on the day following ths ·even1 .whlch'Jlggers 
tho timing raqulrement (ta., A~ptanca. eta.). Performance ·dates ;end times referenced .herein ·sJ:,all not bo blndtng.-~pqr, · 
Utlo companle5, hmders, appraisers and other; not parties to this Contract, except as otherwise-agreed.to ln-wntin~.by 
such non-party. . · · _ 
.. . 22~·FAX TRANSMISSION_AND Ct;)UNTERPARl'S, Facsimile (fax) tranimlsslon of a signed copy of thls.C?ntra(?t, af\y 
· ·. · · · addenda end counteroff~rs.- and the .rutranamlsslon of any signed fax shall bo the ~ame es dellvery:of eh .onglrial.: Thi• . 
. _Cont,:act arid any addenda end .counteroffers may be executed in counterparts. . . 
. 231-ACCEPTANCE, 'Acceptar:1co• occurs when Seller or Buyer, responding to an offur or counteroffer of.the other: (a) 
.. -~lgjia ,he ~ffer or counte~~-wht}ru ~otet! to Indicate acceptance; ~~d {b) communicates; to the 011\er p~rty or-to·thu-Qther 
· .pa~ agent that the offer or counteroff&r has been algned as re·quired. 
/\ ·2it-:CONTRACl DEADUN~ Buyer and Se41er agree that tho following cfeadfines shaU apply to.this Contra.ct .. • . 
. . · .•· .{a) Seller DloclOSU!'9 Oea~llna ,,:; ~ 5 ~. \JSQ.cTl&J A«vp;ell¥'J(; r, · (Date) :·• 
(b) Due-Dm;unce Deadline f#D 't>4:, ~ ~ I.J1t,TTF,J ~e~.,~ (Data) 
._(c) S.tttemtnl bi,adllna ,o b.,._v S ~ .Wrl, ITM Aa:=:fe!&dflr (Date) 
· ·. : .. ~5 •. OFPeR.AND.:TIME 'FOR ACCEPT AHCE. Buyer offers lo purchase the Property on tht above term.~ and conditions.-:[f · 
~:Seifer doe$ nci eceept thlf o·ffer by: fld2Q ( I AM {X] PM Mountain Tune on January W, 2002.(Dat,),.thls offe(shell . 
_.Japse: a· d the B.ro.k~rage shell rotum_the Earnest Money Deposit to Buyer. · 
-.~06 
(Offer Dale) (Buyer'e Signature) (Offer Date) 
The later of thu above Offer Datoe ahaJI be rer,rrad to as ttie "Offer Raference Dote• 
Emmett Werren and or 
Assjgns 
(Buyers' Names) (PLEASE PRINT) (Notf~ Addresi) (Z!p Code) (Phone) 
Pago ,4 or 6 pages Self or's lnit~lls __ e...;;;'.5-__ Dahl 2-· 7. 0 6 BuyV(s kllUals 2.- b- "'" D•U---
· ... 
: . ~ 
-~· -: ..... 
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·""· ACCEPTANCEICOUNTEROFFER/REJ~CTION 
CHECK ONE: 
. . .. }:!:c·EPTANCE OF OFFER ~O PURCHASE: Sellar A~pts the .~r~qlng offer on the terms and condhtans specified . 
tt1 ( ] COUNTEROFFER: .Seller present$ for Buyer's Acceptanc& lhe terms.of Buyer's offer subject to tho exceptions _or 
·· ·_-mQd _. a~onsas specifie.d"ln tne.attached.AODENDUM NO.____ · 
•Dt 
(Date) (TTme) (Seller's Signature) (Date) (Time) 
________ "b_f/_2.._0 _t..i-......;;D~1c'--e_,.;.c:.__.i-ol .... e"---,,__&~w..s;._~~-L<._ (Wt# iPJ~'J.8/, t/-9Z> 
(Sellers' Names) (PLEASE PRINT} (Notice Address) (Zip Code) {PhOno) 
[ ] Rl!JECllON: Seller rejects the foregoing offer. 
(Saller's·Slgnature) (Date) (Time) (Sellefs Signature) 
~Copy1'111hl Uta~ Anocl~tlon of REAt. TOR84) 7.8,04 All Rlgh'ts RHtrvod 





Ruling and Order on June 19, 2014 
Hearing of Defendants' Rule 60(b) Motion 
; 
L. MILES LEBARON (#8982) 
BRIAN P. DUNCAN (#11487) 
LEBARON & JENSEN, P.C. 
[ 
f 
The Order of Court is stated below: ( i 
Dated: October 04, 2014 Isl Noel S. Hyd~ .~- : ..-
08:44:54 AM District Court Iud$e. 
476 West Heritage Park Blvd., Suite 230 
Layton, Utah 84041 
Telephone: (801) 773-9488 
Facsimile: (801) 773-9489 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
Hilary "Skip" Wing, et al, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Still Standing Stable, L.C., et al. 
Defendants. 
Ruling and Order on lune 19, 
2014 Hearing of Defendants' 
Rule 60{b) Motion 
Civil No. 060906802 
Honorable Noel S. Hyde 
On June 19, 2014, the Honorable Noel S. Hyde held a hearing on 
Defendants' Rule 60(b) Motion. L. Miles LeBaron of LeBaron & Jensen, P.C. 
appeared for the Plaintiffs; Robert J. Fuller appeared for Defendant Chuck 
Schvaneveldt and Still Standing Stables, LC.; Scott R. Edgar appeared for 
Third-Party Defendant Cathy Code; and Alan S. Mouritsen of Parsons Behle 
& Latimer appeared for Defendant Chuck Schvaneveldt. 
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Ruling on 60(b) Motion ~ 
The Court considered the Defendants' Motion 60 (b ). The Court's 
ruling on this particular motion is that Rule 60(b) does contain time 
restrictions with respect to some of the subparts, and that that time 
restriction is a three-month time restriction, not a ten-day restriction. The 
reference, I believe, to the ten-day restriction is th~ reference in 60(b )(2), 
to new evidence, which is demonstrated not to have been able to have been 
brought forward in time to file a motion under Rule 59. A motion under Rule 
59 to alter or amend a judgment would necessarily be filed within ten days 
after the judgment, and the Court's ruling on this issue is that that ten-day 
limit that does apply under Rule 59, does not become incorporated into and 
require the filing of the motion under Rule 60. The question, with respect to 
the introduction or consideration of new evidence simply requires a showing 
that that new evidence could not reasonably have been produced in 
sufficient time to bring a motion under Rule 59. It does not require that the 
motion under Rule 60 itself be brought within that ten-day time period. The 
Court's ruling on that issue is that the motion is timely and properly before 
the Court. 
The motion does not assert or request relief under 60(b)(2), although 
the plaintiff suggests that it may be entirely resolved under G0{b )(2). 
2 
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The Court finds the argument of plaintiff not to be persuasive, 60(b) 
(2) being the provision with respect to the consideration of new evidence. No 
relief has been requested on the basis that new evidence has come to light, 
which would justify relief from the judgment, and that could not have been 
provided prior to the filing -- or within time to file a motion under Rule 59. 
That particular form of relief has not been requested. 
The relief that has been requested is relief based upon the assertion, 
either under Rule 60(b)(4); that the judgment itself is void, and that is 
based upon the jurisdiction the claims, or under Rule 60(b)(5), that the case 
has been released, discharged, or otherwise settled or resolved, which is 
not dependent upon a showing of evidence, but actually the fact of a release 
or resolution. And then finally, 60(b)(6), which is a catch-all provision. I'm 
going to address 60(b)(6) first. 
Inasmuch as the substance of the arguments go to the jurisdictional 
question and whether the claim has been settled, the Court rules that the 
references to 60(b)(6) simply don't provide any additional alternative 
grounds for relief, and that simply adding 60(b)(6) does not bolster claims 
under any of the other subparts. So if relief is appropriate under 60(b )( 4 ), it 
should be granted under 60(b)(4). If the basis does not exist under 60{b) 
3 
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(4), the facts alleged in support of that basis do not form a separate basis, 
then, for relief under 60{b)(6). 60(b)(6) is not just a means by which the 
form of relief requested being insufficient under a stated grounds, then 
becomes sufficient when stated under 60(b)(6). The Court's ruling is that 
there has not been a proper showing of any separate basis for relief under 
60(b)(6), and the Court's going to address the motions under 60(b)(4) and 
60(b)(S). 
First, with respect to 60(b)(S), which is that the case has been settled, 
released, or discharged, and that therefore there is no basis for going 
forward with the enforcement of the judgment. The legal basis for this 
argument is that Mr. Dale Quinlan, who has executed documents purporting 
to settle and release or resolve these claims, has the legal authority to do 
so. Necessarily, that would require the Court to find that Mr. Quinlan has 
legal ownership of the claims and the right to settle. 
Tracking back through the documentation and the presentation of the 
parties, the issue comes back to a single document, which is a letter in the 
file of the Department of Corporations dated December 11th, 2013, a letter 
which contains two sentences. "Because of administrative action the 
attached letter in the file of Re/Max Elite, File No. 5800619-0151, comma, 
had been invalidated, period. The ownership of the dba, Re/Max Elite, has 
4 
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been returned to Dale Quinlan." That is the sum total of the documentation 
on which Mr. Schaneveldt relies to establish Mr. Quinlan's present claim of 
ownership. Now, this is tied to a previous signature on an application in 
2004, but it is this letter which would necessarily result in a change of the 
Department of Corporation's records, to reflect Mr. Quinlan as the owner of 
the dba, effective as indicated by counsel, March 3rd, 2014, with a dba being 
returned to him. With respect to this letter, the Court's ruling is that this 
letter will not be given any legal consideration by the Court, for the following 
reasons: 
First, there is a reference in this letter to an administrative action. 
There, however, is no description of any administrative action ever having 
been taken, any notices or any parties that may have participated in this 
action, who may have requested the particular relief. There is no indication 
that any hearings were conducted, that notices were given to any parties. 
There has been suggestion by counsel that that may have happened, but 
there is simply no record at all to suggest what this term means, and to 
what it refers. 
There is also the statement that this letter had been invalidated. 
That's a letter referencing an assignment letter purportedly signed by Mr. 
Quinlan. Again, there's no indication of the process or procedure by which 
5 
.:J October 04, 2014 08:44 AM 
8·)58 
- 5 of 16 
I t 
that determination was made. There is nothing to indicate a judicial 
determination of the validity or invalidity of the letter, and there is simply 
nothing to support this letter being a proper determination of any issue by 
the Department of Corporations. 
There have been numerous references to the statutes and rules that 
must be complied with in respect to the registration and transfer of dbas, 
and there are very specific procedures. There has been no argument or 
suggestion that this letter complies with any specific statute, rule, or 
procedure that authorizes any change in a designated ownership of a dba. 
Absent some showing, both factually and legally, as to the procedure that 
was followed to obtain this letter, and the legal sufficiency of that procedure, 
the Court will not give it any legal significance. The Court further notes that 
to do so may very well constitute a violation of due process rights, without 
some showing that the parties asserting interest in this particular dba had 
been given an opportunity to have input before their property or ownership 
interest in that dba was effected somehow by the Department of 
Corporation. The Court is not ruling that such actions did not take place, it's 
only ruling that no information has been provided to this Court upon which 
a determination can be made that any appropriate process was followed to 
obtain this letter, and therefore the Court will not give it any legal 
6 
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consideration. Based upon that determination, the Court's ruling is that the 
suggestion that the dba was returned to Dale Quinlan, effective March 3rd, 
2014, is legally not recognized; and that, therefore, the dba registration 
continues unaffected by this letter, and its ownership is not resolved by this 
letter, and that there is an insufficient record before the Court to establish 
Mr. Quinlan as the owner of the dba, either in March of 2014 or at any time 
thereafter. 
Based upon the absence of a legally sufficient basis to establish Mr. 
Quinlan as the owner of the dba, his asserted right to settle claims held in 
the name of that dba, or to address or resolve any issues relating to that 
dba, will not be given consideration by the Court. And to the extent that 
documents may have been prepared and signed that purport to do that, 
those documents are not given legal credibility by the Court and will not be 
considered. 
Therefore, the Court rules that there has not been a release, 
discharge, or other resolution or settlement of the claim; and therefore the 
request for relief under Rule 60(b)(S) is overruled and the motion to that 
extent denied. 
The next issue raised -- arises under Rule 60(b)(4), which is an 
allegation of a void judgment. To some extent the argument is similar, and 
7 
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the argument that the judgment is void addresses claims of improper parties 
proceeding in this case, parties without proper standing, and the absence of 
Mr. Quinlan's participation being fatal to both the mediation and to the 
judgment, or to its enforceability. 
The Court is not going to repeat its rulings of yesterday or today 
except to refocus a couple of specific points. And those points are 
that the question of standing was addressed by the Court in motions prior to 
the trial, and resolved by the Court at that time, and there has been no 
showing that any of the evidence that was available to the Court, either at 
that time or at trial, would justify a change in any of those rulings. And the 
Court declines to make any modification on that basis first; and secondly, 
based upon the Court's ruling yesterday, that the judgment, 
once entered, is presumptively correct, and the Court is required, in viewing 
the facts that are presented in the case, to construe those facts in a way 
that is consistent with the judgment. To some extent, when a party is 
coming in requesting that there be a deviation from the judgment, either as 
to form or substance, that, to some extent, requires a marshalling of the 
evidence presented at trial, that supports the judgment first, so that the 
Court can see what evidence there was that is supportive of the findings that 
were made, and then demonstration that, notwithstanding that evidence, 
8 
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there is justification for either relief or modification. That showing has not 
been made in this case. 
Further, with respect to the standing of Mr. Quinlan, or the assertion 
that his participation would be required, the Court notes, and very 
significantly, that at no time, even through today's date, has Mr. Quinlan, 
either individually or through counsel, come forward to assert any claim to 
anything? He is not here today. He is not asserting that he owns anything, 
that he has any rights. He has not attempted to intervene in this case, to 
assert any of those rights. He has taken no action whatever. The positions 
that have been maintained effectively on his behalf have been maintained by 
Mr. Schaneveldt, but there's no indication that Mr. Schaneveldt or his 
counsel has any right to assert claims of Mr. Quinlan but for the assignment 
documents which the Court has previously ruled it will give no legal credence 
in this case. So that is not to be critical of counsel's presentation, because 
there is a document that purports to assign claims, but the Court rules that 
that assignment is not to be given any legal force or effect, based upon the 
Court's ruling on the status of the dba. 
The next issue goes to the argument relating to the failure to maintain 
the dba, or the ability of an entity to maintain an action without a properly 
registered dba. Counsel for Mr. Schaneveldt poses the question, Who can 
9 
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step forward, showing that they are in compliance with all of the 
requirements of the dba statute? The Court's ruling is that question is not 
the right question. There are actually two questions that must be answered 
in order to determine whether there was a proper judgment entered. 
The first question is was there a properly registered and existing dba 
for the business entity that asserted the claim? And the answer to that 
question based upon all of the information that's been presented to the 
Court, is that at all times relevant in all proceedings before the Court, there 
is and has been a duly filed and properly registered dba. That is the first 
question, there being a properly registered dba. 
The second question is, Who is the owner of that dba? But those are 
separate questions. The question of the ability to maintain a lawsuit, or the 
inability to maintain a lawsuit is dependent upon the absence of a properly 
registered dba. That's the Graham case. In this case, there has never been 
a showing that there is an improperly registered dba, or that the dba has not 
been recognized by the state. There has been substantial argument about 
who owns the dba, but that's a different question. And that question, the 
Court's ruling is that prior to the trial in this case, there was substantial 
discussion on standing issues, and who could appear, and whose rights were 
being represented, who were the real parties in interest. The Court has 
IO 







made previous rulings on those issues, and those rulings are not going to be 
disturbed by the Court today. There is evidence that is even before the 
Court today, including the record of the Department of Corporations, that 
shows Legacy Elite as a registered owner of the dba during particular time 
periods. There is documentation that shows Aspenwood Real Estate, either 
as an LLC or as a corporation, as a registered owner of the dba at various 
time. There are documents which purport to assign the dba between those 
entities. There is a document, purportedly signed by Mr. Quinlan, that 
purports to transfer whatever interest he may have had, whether that was a 
bare legal title to the dba that was equitably owned by the corporation 
already, or whether it was something else. That kind of information is not 
before the Court. But to be consistent with the prior rulings, the Court's 
ruling today is that the evidence is sufficient to maintain all of the prior 
rulings of the Court with respect to the issues of standing and ownership of 
the dba, and those rulings will not be disturbed. The suggestion that all of 
the documentation now produced, and the arguments now being made, that 
Mr. Quinlan, in fact, has at all times been the real party in interest, and is 
the only party that has the right to proceed, are simply not persuasive. 
The Court's observation of this case, from the review of the 
proceedings up to the point of trial and then during the post-trial process, is 
11 
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that this issue of Mr. Quinlan's ownership of the dba, and his derivative right 
therefore to effectively control these claims or to transfer them, assign 
them, or compromise them, is a construct, all of which has occurred after 
trial. And it is a construct which is based, to a large extent, on a letter, 
December 11th, 2013, that the Court has previously made reference to, 
which appears to be a deviation from any recognized practice of the 
Department of Commerce. It presupposes findings with respect to issues of 
forgery, or cutting and pasting of documents. None of those issues have 
ever been presented on an evidentiary basis to the Court, and the Court, in 
light of both the timing of its presentation, the fact that Mr. Quinlan's 
involvement, both in the business entity and in the registration of the dba, is 
a matter of public record that has existed for many years, and questions that 
the Court has raised with respect to these documents, the Court will simply 
not countenance the legal argument _that Mr. Quinlan is effectively the 
superseding entity with respect to these claims, and that argument is not 
given further legal consideration by the Court. 
Similarly, the argument with respect to the necessity that the Court 
determine that the judgment is void because of failure to comply with the 
requirements of mediation, while there have been suggestions that specific 
requirements of the mediation rules or statutes may not have technically 
12 
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been complied with, there's been no indication that there was any objection 
made at the time, or that these issues were even raised until they have now 
come up, well after trial, well after the conclusion of that mediation. And 
again, based upon a construct to some extent which superimposes Mr. 
Quinlan's purported rights into that process, suggesting that the failure of 
his participation may also necessarily constitute a failure of the legal 
sufficiency of the mediation, the Court simply will not consider those 
arguments, based upon the analysis which has previously been made. And 
the record before the Court is that a mediation was ordered, and that a 
mediation was conducted. Whether there were technical deficiencies in that 
mediation, to this Court's knowledge, they weren't ever brought to the 
Court's attention in a manner that would have permitted the Court to 
address deficiencies with respect to the mediation, or, at the time, that 
would have permitted the parties to also address those particular issues. 
There has been nothing argued to the Court on those points, and the 
Court rules that the argument with respect to the insufficiency of the 
mediation is not persuasive; therefore, the Court's ruling is that the asserted 
grounds for relief under Rule 60(b )( 4 ), that the judgment itself is void, are 
not well taken. That objection to the form of the judgment is overruled, and 
the motion for relief denied. And I believe that is all of the issues that were 
13 
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addressed in the 60{b) motion. 
ORDER 
Based upon the Court's Ruling, it is hereby ordered as follows: 
1. Defendants' Rule 60(b) Motion is denied. 
-------------------------END OF ORDER-------------------------
In accordance with the Utah State District Courts Efiling Standard 
No. 4, and URCP Rule l0{e), this Order does not bear the 
handwritten signature of the Judge, but instead displays an 
electronic signature at the upper right-hand corner of the first page 
of this Order. 
Approved as to form and content: 
Isl Gary E, Doctorman 
Gary E. Doctorman 
Alan S. Mouritsen 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendant Charles 
Schvaneveldt 
October 04, 2014 08:44 AM 
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Isl Robert J. Fuller 
Robert J. Fuller 
Attorney for Defendant Still 
Standing Stables, L. C. 
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Isl L. Miles Lebaron 
L. Miles Lebaron 
Brian P. Duncan 
LEBARON & JENSEN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
@ October 041 2014 08:44 AM 
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L···: t . 
Isl Scott R, Edgar 
Scott R. Edgar 
Attorney for Defendant Cathy Code 
.. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was 
submitted for electronic filing, and was thus sent to all counsel of record by 
email: 
Robert R. Wallace 
Kirton McConkie 
60 East South Temple # 1800 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Robert J. Fuller 
1090 North 5900 East 
Eden, Utah 84310 
Scott R. Edgar 
1379 North 1075 West, Suite 226 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Gary E. Doctorman 
Parsons Behle & Latimer 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
on this 22nd day of August 2014. 
October 04, 2014 08:44 AM 
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